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This paper provides a comprehensive study of the Stock Splits activities in the Hong Kong 
Capital Market. We examine the hypotheses about the stock splits using two divergent 
but complementary approaches - analysing a sample of stock splits on the Stock Exchange 
over the period 1990 through 1996 and surveying market practitioners. Consistent with 
studies made in the U.S. capital markets, our analysis shows that stock split are associated 
with a positive and significant announcement effects while the findings do not 
demonstrate that there is any significant exercise date effects and any significant change of 
volatility and risk. Moreover, in-depth interviews with corporate managements and other 
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Capital market regularities have been a subject of intense interest to financial 
economists in recent years. Stock splits is one of the examples which have presented 
financial theorist with a conundrum. 
It is believed that in a perfect and efficient market, there are no financial 
illusions. Investors are mainly concerned with the company's cash flows and the 
portion of those cash flows to which they are entitled. One of the basic tenets of 
modern finance theory is that the total market value of a firm's equity is independent of 
the number of shares outstanding. Unlike most cash dividend and capital structure 
changes, stock splits and stock dividends are accounting rearrangements of the 
owners' equity structure that do not provide the corporation with any new funds or the 
stockholders with any additional claims to company assets. The economic value ofthe 
corporation remains unchanged with the corporate pie simply being cut into more 
pieces. These "nonevents" seem to be purely cosmetic accounting changes with no 
direct benefit. 
Nevertheless, if such distribution is just a finer slicing of a given “ cake" - the 
total market value of the firm, then why do so many firms continue to engage in such 
financial manipulations? For example, in 1990, there is more than fourteen Hong 
Kong companies participating in these activities, particularly, shareholders receive no 
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tangible benefits from stock splits while there are costs that are associated with stock 
splits 
The evidence of stock splits studies in the U.S. is quite abundant. While many 
of them focus on the impact of stock splits on abnormal returns to shareholders, some 
authors concem with the informational content of stock splits that convey certain 
signals to stock investors. Still, others advocate the impact of splits on liquidity, 
volatility and risk. 
However, empirical evidence of stock splits in capital markets other than the 
U.S. is rather rare. In Hong Kong, there are only several researchers used stock 
market data to study the real effects of stock splits. For example, Wu and Chan 
(1996) find that stock splits are associated with a positive and significant stock market 
response. They also suggest that there exists a positive relation between the 
magnitude of the split factor and the deviation of the pre-split stock price from the 
historical price level in the split sample. 
Conversely, there are few studies which have tried to determine the motivation 
for stock splits by interviewing managers of splitting companies and to address the 
comments from market practitioners on stock splits. Yet both the market practitioners 
and researchers often draw inferences from such managerial decisions. 
Therefore, in this paper, we examine the hypotheses about stock splits by using 
two divergent but complementary approaches - interpreting market data and surveying 
managements and professionals. Firstly, based on the twenty-seven stock samples 
collected from Hong Kong Stock Market during 1990 to 1996，we extend the 
evidences from Wu and Chan's (1996) study and mainly focus on three main aspects 
of stock splits: (i) shareholder wealth effects (ii) change ofvolatility and (iii) change of 
risk. Secondly, we attempt to gain some insight on managerial motives of splits and 
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market comments on split issues in Hong Kong by interviewing corporate mangements 
involved in split decisions, equity analysts, merchant bankers and professional and 
small investors. 
In the study, we find out a positive and significant stock market reaction on the 
announcement of stock splits. While the findings do not demonstrate that there is any 
significant exercise date effects and any significant change of volatility and risk. The 
interview results show that the primary managerial motive of a split is future fund 
raising, followed by enhancing liquidity and signaling favorable future prospects. 
This paper is organized into seven main chapters. Chapter II provides a brief 
and critical review of the literature. Chapter III provides a general description of the 
data in this paper. Chapter IV & V presents the methodology and empirical results. 





Neither stock splits nor stock dividends are recent phenomena. Lakonishok and 
Lev (1987) describe that the stock dividends can date back to the Elizabethan age. 
Among the first to declare such dividends is the East India Company, which enjoy 
great prosperity, declare in 1682 a stock dividend of one hundred percent. 
As for stock splits, they become quite common as early as the beginning of this 
century. With reference to Lakonishok and Lev's (1987) research, out of the 837 
common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange as ofDecember 31, 1930, no 
less than 150 has been splitted once or more between 1921 and 1930. 
The stock split activities tend to continue its popularity up to the present day. 
In Ohlson and Penman's (1985) research, they have more than 1,257 stock splits 
samples instituted by 910 firms between July 2, 1962 and December 31，1981 from 
CRSP's Monthly Master File. 
Stock split is a puzzling phenomenon to financial economists. Although these 
nonevents appear to be purely cosmetic changes, research shows real effects associated 
with them. Despite extensive study, controversies still abound in the literature about 
these effects. These controversies include whether stock splits affect shareholder 
wealth, provide signals to the market, improve liquidity, impose impact on volatility 




In early studies, empirical research on splits by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969), and then later by Bar and Brown (1977), and Charest (1978) present evidence 
which is interpreted as a split announcement effect. Basically, they focus on the 
announcement effects associated with splits, and their statistical analysis demonstrate 
that retums are above average prior to the splits. They interpret these above-average 
returns as reflecting the revaluation of substantial "good new" information in 
conjunction with the split declaration, for example, announcements of unexpected 
dividend increase. 
However, the study of these price reactions is complicated by the fact that 
announcement of stock splits is usually made in connection with other corporate 
information releases. Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) show that even in "clean 
case", that is，where no other firm-specific event coincides with a split announcement, 
they report a positive abnormal retum of 3.3 percent over the two day even window 
surrounding the announcement. This result is verified in later studies such as 
Lamourex and Poon (1987) and they conclude that the market attaches a positive 
value to the split because of its tax-option impact. 
Stovall (1997) mention that, with reference to academic studies and statistics 
gathered by Standard & Poor's，stocks will usually rise in price at the time when a 
stock split is announced. Although they then often slip a bit on an adjusted basis after 
the split actually takes place, they still tend to remain above the pre announcement 
level, because the dividend is almost always boosted. Exceptions to the dividend 
increase expectations are those few demonstrated high-growth powerhouses，like 
Amgen, which have a policy of no cash dividend distribution. Such managements have 
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convinced shareholders that they are best served by plowing all earnings back into the 
business. 
• In Hong Kong, Wu and Chan (1996) find that stock splits are associated with a 
positive and significant stock market response. Also they consider that a positive 
relation between the magnitude of the split factor and the deviation of the pre-split 
stock price from the historical price level exists. 
Information Signal 
Stock splits themselves do not directly affect a company's cash flows, the 
increase in a company's stock price at the time of these announcement must, assuming 
market efficiency，reflect the release of new information. An explanation first 
proposed by Fama, Fisher，Jensen and Roll (1969) and repeated in subsequent studies 
is that the market interprets stock splits announcements as improving the probability of 
near-term dividend increases. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) report data 
consistent with the dividend explanation: 71.5 percent of their sample firms experience 
a percentage dividend increase in the year after split which is larger than the average 
increase for all securities on the New York Stock Exchange. Thus，they argue that a 
large price increase at the time of a stock split is due to altered expectations 
concerning future dividends rather than due to any intrinsic effects of the splits 
themselves. 
However this “ dividend hypothesis” does not appear to fully explain the 
phenomenon as Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) report a significant stock price 
reaction to the announcement by firms that do not pay cash dividends in three years 
prior to the split. An alternative explanation is that the information revealed by stock 
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splits concern earnings rather than dividends. Two types of eamings information can 
be conveyed by stock splits. First, Baker and Powell (1993) say that splits can provide 
favorable information about improved future eamings performance. This "signaling 
hypothesis" discussed by Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), Lakonishok and Lev 
(1984), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), and McNichols and Dravid (1990) is that 
stock splits are used by managers to convey favorable information to the market. For 
example, Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) find that some information content of 
stock splits appears to be associated directly with companies' future cash flows. 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) conclude that their evidence seems consistent with some 
signals conveyed by stock splits, about either stabilization of eamings growth after the 
abnormal pre-split growth, improved cash dividends prospects, or both. A study by 
Ikenberry (1996) examine every 2:1 stock split on the New York Stock Exchange and 
American Stock Exchange between 1975 and 1990. It find that these stocks continued 
to outperform the market for up to three years following the announcement of those 
splits. 
A second type of earnings information that can be conveyed by splits concems 
pre-split earnings. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find that splitting firms have large 
eamings increase prior to the split. Split decisions are based on managers' superior 
information that pre-split earnings increases are permanent, then the split 
announcement will lead investors to revalue the pre-split eamings growth. 
Asquith’ Healy and Palepu (1989) suggest that pre-split earnings increases are 
due to both industry and company-specific factors. Companies that announce stock 
splits are in industries which perform well, but the companies even outperform their 
industries in the year prior to the split date. Their results indicate that companies split 
their shares after a significant increase in eamings. Before the stock split 
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announcement, the market expects these earnings increases to be temporary. The split 
announcement leads investors to increase their expectations that the past earnings 
increases are permanent. They conclude that there is earnings information conveyed 
by stock splits. However, they do not necessarily explain managers' motives for 
splitting their companies' stocks. Managers may not view stock splits as a means of 
communicating earnings information. Irrespective of their motives, if managers use 
their superior information on the permanence of pre-split earnings growth in making 
split decisions, investors will interpret a split as confirming that past earnings are 
permanent, consistent with their results. 
Impact on Liquidity 
Generally speaking, it is beneficial to split the stock of a company if the price is 
high relative to its peer industry or market group. Reducing the price to a preferential 
price range helps increase the stockholder interest, makes the stock more liquid in the 
market. 
Despite the common notion that stock splits improve liquidity, Copeland 
(1979)，Lamoureux and Poon (1987), and Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) report that 
trading liquidity decreases after a stock split. These studies measure liquidity using 
proportional trading volume and percentage bid-ask spreads. In contrast， 
Murray(1985) finds no evidence that stock splits have a significant adverse impact on 
either proportional trading volume or percentage bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) report that splits do not appear to exert a permanent effect 
on trading volume. 
I 
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The only empirical evidence that trading liquidity improves after a stock split 
involves increase in stock ownership and the number of transactions. Lamoureux and 
Poon (1987) report that the number of shareholders increase after a split. This 
evidence suggests that stock splits increase the number of shareholders by lowering 
share price to a more popular range. Therefore, liquidity increases because more 
persons are buying or selling the stock. They report an increase in the number of daily 
post-split transactions which also may increase trading liquidity. 
Impact on VoIatiiitv 
Ohlson and Penman (1985) demonstrate that, for stock splits larger than two-
for one, the volatility of stock retums after the ex-split date is significantly higher than 
the pre-split volatility. Dravid (1987) subsequently re-examine the issue from the 
opposite direction, by investigating whether retum volatility will decrease after the 
reverse stock splits. He use the same methodology of Ohlson and Penman (1985), but 
investigating the volatility of retums for reverse splits. And his evidence show that this 
is indeed the case and thus provide support to the Ohlson and Penman's (1985) result. 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) suggest that the split results in an increase in both 
the number of transactions and shares traded which increase the volatility of the price 
series. Are option traders able to use this change in volatility to make trading profits in 
the market? Basically, the price of call option will increase if the price of the stock 
increases or the volatility increases. Using the Black-Scholes model to compute the 
option value, it shows that public investors can probably not make great profit from a 
trading strategy based on this information, because the cost of the bid-ask spread will 
increase significantly as market participants attempt to utilize such a strategy. 
t 
10 
Impact on Risk 
Risk can be thought of as the possibility that the actual retums from holding a 
security will deviate from the expected retums. It is known to us that a particular 
event related to a firm may affect the risk level of such firm, for example, the firm takes 
a risky project and such event-dependent risk is worthwhile to study. One of the 
earliest and most influential event-time studies is that of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and 
Roll (1969). In their examination of stock splits, they find a substantial buildup in 
Cumulative Average Retum up to the split. The authors hypothesis that abnormal 
retum emerge from the anticipation by investors that dividends will soon increase， 
during which time the stock price is bid upward. They further hypothesis that the 
stock price will stabilize by the time of split. Thus they interpret a split to have no 
inherent value except to provide information about a firm's dividend policy, signaling 
the firm's long-run growth potential. According to their interpretation, because splits 
are usually followed by dividend increase, the split announcement serves to reduce 
informational uncertainty and to induce retums to revert to normalcy, thus investors' 
uncertainty shall rise before and fall after the announcement o f the stock split, that is, 
the systematic risk is “concave” 
Bar and Brown (1977) recreate the Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) 
study to see if pre-split retum variability is manifested in increased beta. Using a 
"systematic moving window" regression technique, on the market model, they find， 
after obtaining monthly estimates of a and P for every security in their analysis, that 
the sample -wide average of the moving p rise more than ten percent, reach a peak 
close to the split date, and fall to form a hump shape over their event period. Thus, 
their results coincide with that of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969). They 
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suggest the split announcement may reduce investor uncertainty regarding the 
permanent of pre-split earnings and may signal investors that higher total cash 
dividends are likely to forthcoming. 
Copeland and Brennan (1988) find that the "beta coefficient" exhibit a 
temporary increase of about twenty percent at the time of a split announcement and 
increase about thirty percent at the time the split became effective. In the seventy-five 
days following the split, the beta remains about eighteen percent above its pre-split 
level. 
Managerial Motives 
According to Baker and Powell (1993), surveys in the 1920s have revealed that 
the primary motive of splits is to increase the liquidity of the stock and thus bring a 
wider distribution of shares. Surveys carry out 50 years later get similar results that 
companies issuing stock splits report that they did so to provide a better trading range 
and thereby attract investors and enhance trading liquidity. These similarities in 
managerial attitudes over this long period are striking. 
Meanwhile, there are many hypotheses that explain the persistence ofsplits 
and their associated effects. Since the publication of the classic paper by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll in 1969，the signaling hypothesis and the trading range hypothesis have 
emerged in the finance literature as the leading explanations of stock splits. Generally 
speaking，researches on stock splits propose that managerial motives for stock splits 





Traditionally, splits are regarded as rational price management decisions. That 
is，there exists rationally determined, though imprecise, upper and lower bounds on 
share prices, and that managers use splits to keep prices within these bounds. This 
view is supported by Lakonishok and Lev (1987), who say that, essentially, stock splits 
are executed by firms that have enjoyed an unusual growth in their earnings and stock 
prices. The main objective of the split appears to be the retum of the stock price to a 
desirable '^rading range" in wake of the unusual growth period. They consider that 
companies prefer a long run average price and that company managers adopt the 
market average price and the industry average price as indicators of the long mn price 
target. They find in their sample of stock splits that the magnitude of the split factor is 
positively related to the ratio of the pre-split share price to these two variables. Since 
the need to realign share prices usually stems from a pre-split price run-up, they think 
that the trading range hypothesis links splits more to past performance than to fiiture 
performance. 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) provide further support for an optimal trading 
range. They find that split factors are an increasing function of pre-split prices which 
implies that managers have some preferred trading range in mind when issuing stock 
splits. They also find an inverse relationship between split factors and the market value 
of a company's equity. This finding implies higher preferred trading ranges for larger 
firms. 
In the study of Mann and Moore (1996), they report empirical evidence for a 
sample of over 1500 split decisions executed during 1967-1989 and obtain results 




Moreover, the study ofWu and Chan (1996), use a sample of stock splits and 
reverse stock splits on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong over the period 1986 
through 1992, suggests a positive relation between the magnitude of the split factor 
and the deviation of the pre-split stock price from the historical price level in the stock 
split sample, which supports the view that companies choose the spUt factor as a 
device to retum the stock price to an optimal price range. 
The trading range hypothesis also presumes that shareholders prefer to 
purchase round lots but cannot afford to do so when the share price is high. 
Opponents argue that fees for odd lots are small and institutional investors, who 
purchase more stocks than individuals, are indifferent to price levels, provided the 
expected returns are commensurate with the risk. 
Signaling 
Another explanation for a split is the signaling or information asymmetry 
hypothesis which states that stock splits are informative signals of favorable future 
prospects for the company. Given information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, the former may use stock splits to convey favorable information to the latter. 
This argument requires some cost for false signaling. Otherwise, separating 
undervalued from overvalued stocks of companies declaring stock splits will be 
impossible. As discussed before, most of the academic researches on information 
signaling ofstock splits support the signaling hypothesis. 
Liquidity 
A third explanation for issuing stock splits focuses on managements' desire to 
use splits to improve trading liquidity. Proponents ofthis view suggest that splitting 
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companies can make shares more attractive to investors by lowering the stock price. 
Moreover, by attracting attention，stock splits may affect both the number of trades 
and the number ofstockholders. Increases in these two variables may serve to increase 
a stock's post-split liquidity. For example, ifsplits enable more individual investors to 
buy shares in round lots, the number of trades may increase，despite the average size of 
the trades may decline. As discussed earlier, empirical research is inconsistent on the 
effect of stock splits on trading liquidity. 
Other Motives 
Copeland (1979) mention that another explanation for splits, probably is that 
they create 'Svider" markets. Following a split, the number of shareholders may 
increase simply because an individual, who holds one round lot and who is likely to sell 
it to one buyer before a two-for-one split, may sell two round lots to two people. 
Moreover, the split may place the stock in the limelight and serve as attention 
getter，but this possibility may be flatly rejected by evidence from the market response 
to reverse splits. As Lamoureux and Poon (1987) show that the market respond 
unfavorably to reverse-split announcements. Thus, just getting the company's name 
mentioned does not always yield positive results. 
Research Findings 
Bishara (1988) cited Baker and Gallagher's (1980) study which surveyed 100 
chieffinancial officers o fNew York Stock Exchange listed companies with stock splits 
in 1978. They provided liquidity and signaling as major reasons for stock splits. Other 
minor reasons include: (i) Stock splits may result in increased product sales; (ii) by 
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increasing the number of shareholders, after the stock splits, mergers can be avoided; 
(iii) splits may lead to an improvement in employer-employee relations. 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) suggest that a company's desire to keep its stock 
price in a certain range may outweigh its desire to signal inside information to 
investors. That is，a company's pre-split price and market value of equity explain more 
of the variance of split factors than information signaling variables. 
Baker and Powell (1993) use the responses from a 1991 mail survey to 
examine managerial motives for issuing stock splits. The sample consist of 251 New 
York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange companies that issued stock 
splits of at least 25 percent between 1987 and 1990. Base on survey data from 136 
responding companies, the evidences suggest that the main motive of a split is moving 
the stock price into a better trading range, followed by improving trading liquidity. 
The respondents also agree that a stock split occurs after an upward trend in a 
company's stock price and earnings per share. These results are consistent with the 
empirical study reported by Lakonishok and Lev (1987) that companies with an 
unusual growth in earnings and stock prices execute stock splits. 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1996) investigate the trading patterns of small and 
large traders around stock split ex-dates by using the intraday transaction database for 
the Toronto Stock Exchange during 1983 to 1989. They draw five major conclusions: 
First, stock splits are associated with significant changes in trading patterns of small 
traders. Although stock splits appear to have little effect on the trading behavior of 
large traders (trade value of at least $100,000), they are associated with significant 
decreases in odd-lot trading and increases in small board-lot trading (trade value ofless 
than $10,000). Small board-lot traders tend to trade split stocks at a higher frequency, 
trading value, and volume, and at a lower transaction size post-split. These findings 
I 
16 
support the hypotheses that stock splits allow small investors to benefit from the 
economies associated with board-lot trading and increase the marketability of split 
stocks for small traders. Second, stock splits appear to have no significant effect on 
the trading activities of large traders. Taking into account the first conclusion, they 
support the optimal price range hypothesis. Third, the liquidity premia are significantly 
lower post-split for all trade sizes. Fourth, although the liquidity premia decrease for 
all trade sizes, trade direction changes significantly from sell to buy after split ex-dates 
for all but the large traders, where the change is in the opposite direction. This 
provides further support for the conjecture that split stocks become more attractive to 
small investors. Fifth, the significant increase in variances after split ex-dates is 
explained by various microstructure-related variables, and small (large) trades appear 
to be (de)stabilizing. 
In addition to the academic researches, market practitioners in the U.S. actually 
regard stock splits as offering many benefits to the stockholders and the company. 
However, the procedures for completing a stock split are complicated and time 
consuming. It takes good planning; adequate support from treasury, legal, systems, 
and accounting areas in-house; and substantial communication with the New York 
Stock Exchange and the transfer agent as extemal partners. Although the accounting 
is basic, updating the records, completing all letters required, and responding to 
stockholders' questions can be time consuming and difficult. Provided the analyses are 
well done and the decisions regarding the company's position in the market and the 
peer group are sound, a stock split will enhance the company's stock price performance 
and increase the stockholder value in the long run. The New York Stock Exchange 
20-year study also confirms the upward movement of split stocks. This movement 
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The Fact Book published by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited 
(SEHK), basically covers financing activities and capital changes in Hong Kong listed 
companies. In the Fact Book, we find out that there are more than 160 stock splits 
and stock dividends between 1990 to 1996. But we have only selected 27 samples 
which are suitable for our final samples. The others have to be dropped for at least 
one of the following reasons:-
(i) We do not adopt the stock dividend sample in our study. In Hong 
Kong, pure sample of stock dividends is very difficult to collect as 
stock dividends are almost always distributed with cash dividends. Wu 
and Chan (1996) mention that the percentage of new shares distributed 
is quite small, the majority of distribution sizes covers 10 percent to 25 
percent. Based on observation, we consider that the stock dividend 
acts as mean to regulate the level of the stock price. Furthermore, since 
stock dividends are usually distributed along with cash dividends, it is 
plausible that stock dividend is in general used as a substitute or 




(ii) There exists major capital structure changes, such as mergers, takeover 
activities during the year of the stock splits 
The samples are somewhat representative of most of the major categories of 
the stock listed locally: utilities, property, industrial and conglomerates. Company 
names, announcement dates, effective dates and split factors are collected from the 
Fact Book and Securities Journals. We exclude the samples which have 
announcements of earnings，dividends, right issues, bonus issues, and mergers and 
acquisitions. We cover 27 “pure” stock splits. The daily stock price and Hang Seng 
Index are obtained from Datastream 
Split Factor  
Year ofsplit 2 2.5 4 5 8 10 20 Total 
1990 7 1 0 3 0 1 1 13 
1991 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
1992 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
1993 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 
1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
199 6 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Total 14 1 2 7 1 1 1 27 
Exhibit 1 Split Factor Distribution of Samples 
Looking at the distribution sample, it seems that the stock splits are clustered 
around a particular state of market condition. Exhibit 1 also shows the distribution of 
split factor (SF). We define the SF as the number of new shares after the split per 
original share. For these samples, the largest number of firms have chosen a 2-for-l 
split. Fourteen splits (51.8 percent) were made with a split factor of 2. Also, 4-for-l 
splits and 5-for-l splits appear to be popular, accounting for two splits (7.4 percent) 
and seven splits (25.9 percent) respectively. 
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Price Range Pre-split Post-split  
P<=1 2 9 
l<P<=3 8 10 
3<P<=10 10 5 
10<P<=20 3 2  
20<P 4 1  
Exhibit 2 Price Distribution ofPre- and Post Split Shares 
Exhibit 2 presents the distribution of share prices before and after the stock 
distribution. The largest category of pre-split stock price ranges is from HK$3.01 to 
HK$10 per share . This category accounts for 37 percent of the total samples. After 
the split, the largest group of price range is HK$1.01 to HK$3.00, accounting for 37 





Shareholder Wealth Effects 
The event study methodology is employed to examine the effect of split on the 
share prices. The event excess retums are estimated using the Market Model. An 
estimate of the excess retum for the common stock of the firm engaging in event i on 
day t is the abnormal retum: 
( I ) ARit = R i t - ( a i + piRn,t) 
where: 
Rit = The rate of retum for security i on day t 
= (Pt - P t-i) / P t-i, where P is the daily closing 
price of the security 
Rmt = The rate of retum for the Hong Kong Hang Seng 
Index on day t 
» 
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Rmt = {11 -11-1) / 1 t-i, where I is the daily closing of 
Hang Seng Index 
cti and pi = The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of 
the Market Model from a regression covers two 
calendar years dated back from the last trading 
date of the year previous to the event date. 
Post-event returns are used to estimate the Ordinary Least Square parameters 
for split announcements because of the evidence provided by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and 
Roll(1969) that firms tend to split their shares following periods of positive abnormal 
returns. This makes the use of pre-event retums inappropriate for estimating retum 
benchmark for split announcements. 
For each event date t，the average of the AR for all firms are calculated to yield 
the average abnormal retum (AAR): 
n 
(II) AARt = 1/n Z ARit 
i=l 
For an event window of p days, the cumulative abnormal retum (CARp) is 
calculated as the aggregate of each of the pARs for the event window: 
(III) CARp = I AARti 
i=i 
The t-statistic (t) for the AAR and CAR are calculated as follows: 
tAAR =AAR/SDAAR , tcAR =CAR/SDcAR 
where SDAAR/ SDcAR is the estimated standard deviations over the event date 
and the sample periods. 
The raw retum, cumulative raw retum, abnormal retum, cumulative abnormal 
retum and t-value of the event - date abnormal retum for the period from fifteen days 
before and fifteen days after the announcement date / effective dates are estimated. 
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The event studies cover both the announcement date and effective date. In 
case of announcements, the event date (day 0) is identified as the date of 
announcement as reported in the Securities Journals. Similarly, the event date for the 
ex-date is the effective date of the stock distribution as reported by the Fact Book. 
Changes of Volatility 
Binomial z-Statistic Model 
To develop a meaningfol way to analyze the volatility change of the stock 
before and after splits, we need firstly to have hypotheses. In this research, with 
reference to Ohlson and Penman's (1985) study, the basic null and alternative 
statistical hypotheses can be stated as， 
Ho : Var [ R2 ] - Var [ R! ] = 0 
Hi : Var [ R2 ] - Var [ Ri ]本 0 
where: 
R2 = Return drawn from periods that follow splits date 
Ri = Return drawn from periods that follow announcement dates but 
precede splits dates 
The reason why we choose this period is mainly because we want to avoid the 
announcement effect. 
By definition, Var ( R ) = E ( R ' ) - [E ( R ) ] \ but [ E ( R ) ] ‘ is fairly small， 
approximately in order of 10''^  in the present study. Therefore, the variance in the basic 
hypothesis can be approximated as E ( Ri ^ )，i = 1,2. 
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In short, the null and alternate hypotheses become: 
H 0 : E ( R 2 ' ) - E ( R , ' ) = 0 
H 1: E ( R2' ) - E ( R,2 )本 0 
A non-parametric test is used because, first, it relies on few assumptions about 
the underlying stochastic process of stock retums. Second, the reason is of particular 
importance to the issue at hand since, as yet，there exists no known theory to support 
why such a shift in variance might be expected at all. Furthermore, considering the 
size of the present sample, a non-parametric test will be preferred. 
For each split, the squared retum for the first trading day following the split 
announcement is matched with its counterpart following the actual split date. This is 
repeated for each of the subsequent days. Assuming independence across N 
observations, the related simple Binomial Statistic is asymptotically distributed N(0,1). 
In this test, we will use the Binomial Proportionality Statistics Pr{ R2^  > Ri^}, i.e. the 
number of cases where R2^  > Ri^, pool across splits and dates, divide by the total 
number of such comparisons. Specifically, the statistical hypotheses are: 
Ho： Pr [ R2' > Ri' ] = 0.5 
Hi: Pr [ R2^  > Ri^ ] ;^0.5 
with a Binomial z- Statistic given by : 
[ P r - n ( 0 . 5 ) ] / >(05)(0.5) 
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Change of Risk 
By means of the market model, we estimate betas for each security for two 
different time intervals that are defined relative to the split announcement and ex-dates. 
The first time interval is the period between the split announcement and the date it 
become effective，which is called the "announcement interval" by Copeland (1988). 
The second interval is a period after the ex-date, for each security, which is the same 
length as the announcement interval. In estimating these two betas for each security, 
the retums on the announcement and ex-dates are excluded. 
By means of the method of Ordinary Least Square, the slope of the regression 
lines of each period are calculated. 
The hypothesis is based on the following :-
p2 - Pi = 0 
where Pi and P2 are the weighted average pre-split and post-split beta for the 
studied stocks respectively. However, since the sizes of changes vary from company 
to company, it is more meaningfial to use percentage changes in beta，thus 
x j = [p2j - 3 , j ] / 3 i j 
where Xj is the percentage changes in beta for stock j. The hypothesis is then 
stated as :-
HO : X = 0 
H1 : X > 0 
I 
26 
We use sample standard deviation to estimate the unknown population 
standard deviations. Thus the standard error of the population means are estimated 
by:-
Gx = a / V^ 
To test this hypothesis, t distribution is used:-
t = [ E ( X j ) - ^ix ] / a x 
The significant level is set to 0.1，with the degree of freedom of 25. 
Interview 
Interviewees 
To help ensure responses from knowledgeable individuals, we choose to 
interview those who have involved in stock split decisions or those familiar with stock 
splits. We have seventeen interviewees. Four of them are corporate managements of 
listed companies: three directors and one financial controller, all of them are actively 
participated in their own company's most recent stock split decisions. The other 
interviewees include three merchant bankers, three equity analysts, three professional 
investors and four small investors. We classify those investors who actively participate 
in equity investment, perform stock analysis and maintain an average share portfolio of 
over HK$5,000,000 as professional investors. 
Interview schedule 
We have conducted unstructured, in-depth interviews with the interviewees so 
as to get their general opinions on stock splits. 
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As there is no research study on managerial motives and split opinions in Hong 
Kong, it is unfair to make presumptions and construct specific questions in our 
interviews which might limit our information flow on the topic. Instead, we carry out 
unstructured interviews to get original ideas from our interviewees. The major 
questions we have addressed are as follows: (i) Under what circumstances companies 
will consider stock splits? (ii) What are their purposes? (iii) Can they be attained 
through splits? (iv) What is the preferred trading range, if any, of a company issuing a 
stock split? (v) How do company managers decide on or the merchant bankers advised 
on the magnitude of the split factor? (vi) Why a stock split and not a bonus issue is 
used? (vii) Any side effects of splits? (viii) Are splitting shares attractive? (ix) Any 





Shareholder Wealth Effects 
Exhibit three and four cover the event study results on both the announcement 
date and the ex-date of the 27 "pure" stock split samples which are not affected by 
other contemporaneous announcements. 
In exhibit three, it shows that during the pre-armouncement period，the average 
splitting stock experiences a significant run-up in stock price. The cumulative average 
• 
return jump up to 12.81 percent (day-15 through day 0). The t-values show that the 
average abnormal returns from days -4 to 0 are highly significant (t-vales are 2.3749， 
7.7715, 7.4266, 4.2340 and 3.6704). This abnormal retums, however, is gradually 
reversed in the following ten trading days. These ten post -announcement days 
together account for a negative abnormal retums of two percent. Seven of these ten 
retums are statistically significant. 
In exhibit four, it presents that prior to the ex-date, there appears to be positive 
cumulative returns for both average retums and average abnormal retums，however, 
negative abnormal returns are recorded following the ex-date. All t-vales are smaller 
than one, generally speaking, the result does not support any valuation change around 
the ex-date 
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the market 
practitioners perceive a positive information with the announcement of stock splits. 
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Furthermore, the short term cumulative abnormal retum pattems surrounding split 
announcements are similar to those reported by Wu and Chan (1996) for samples of 
Hong Kong companies. 
Volatility Changes After Splits 
With reference to the Binomial Proportionality Statistics Pr { R2^  > Ri^ }, the 
number of cases where R2^  > Ri^, are pool across splits and dates and divided by the 
total number of such comparisons. In this study, based on the 1,076 daily retum 
comparisons, there are 423 instances in which R2^  is strictly greater than R , 
Therefore， 
Pr [ R2' - Ri ' ] = 423 / 1,076 
= 0.3931 
with z- statistic of 
z = [423-(0.5)(l,076)]/ ^1,076(0.5)(0.5) 
= -7.0117 
Binomial z-Statistic show extremely insignificant at any level, which is quite 
closed to the results of Cheung (1983). Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected based on the Hong Kong Market data. 
Beta Chanees Around Stock Spiits 
Based on the hypothesis mentioned in Section IV，twenty seven Xjs are 
calculated. The results show that 51.85 percent of the studied companies show an 
increase in the value of Xj. The smallest value of Xj is only -80.34 percent while the 
largest value is as large as 128.21 percent. The expected value o f X j is found to be 
24.79 percent and the standard deviation of this sample is 109.21 percent . 
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Thereon，the standard error of the population mean is calculated as follows:-
Cx = a / yfii 
= 21.017percent 
Thereon，t - value is 1.179. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This means that the betas of 
Hong Kong companies do not show a significant change after the stock spUts, which 
contradicts to the findings of Copeland and Brennan (1988). 
Interview Results 
Managerial Motive 
All corporate managements stated that they would consider the possibility of a 
stock split after an upward trend in their companies' share prices, depending on the 
economic condition and the level of trading activities in the stock market. The 
interview results presented in this paper give managements' professed intentions for 
undertaking stock splits: 
Future fund raising 
Among the four corporate managements in our interview, three of them clearly 
indicated that fixture ftind raising was the primary motive for considering or 
undertaking a split. They realized that individual or small investors, who continued to 
pour millions into equities and participated actively in the stock market, responded 
quite favorably to splits. Therefore, they would consider a split when the share price 
was high in order to increase the attractiveness of its shares to more investors, 
especially the individual or small ones, thus widened the shareholder base. So that at 
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some future time the company would be better positioned to go to the capital markets. 
It followed the same principle that explained why a company secured lines of credit in 
good times, so it could borrow later. One director quoted that Berkshire Hathaway, 
the holding company for investment tycoon Warren Buffett's insurance, publishing and 
candy business, might never have split its share since it did not need to raise money. 
Other growth oriented companies such as PepsiCo repeatedly split, creating higher 
multiples that helped position themselves to tum to the capital markets in time of need. 
The merchant bankers shared this view and believed that a company whose stock price 
was too high, which limited the future upside potential of its share price, would has its 
multiples skewed. 
In order to attract more investors and enlarge the shareholder base, the 
managements and the merchant bankers stressed that both the price per share and the 
dollar value per round lot after the split were important. The directors in our interview 
confirmed that they presumably had some preferred trading range in mind when 
considering a stock split and they supported trading range hypothesis by confirming 
that stock splits could be used as a means to retum the share price to that optimal 
trading range when the company with an unusual growth in share prices. The optimal 
range was based on market sentiment, historical average of the share price, market and 
industry-wide price averages and possibly on some company-specific prices. For 
example, companies might split and increase the supply of shares at a time when the 
market was best able to absorb it and when trading activity was at a high level. 
Moreover, as the Stock Exchange ofHong Kong Limited provided no guideline on the 
number of shares per round lot. Managements of splitting companies usually 
announced a change in the number of share per round lot simultaneously with the 
announcement of the split factor. The basic principle was that the number of shares 
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was to be adjusted such that the dollar value per round lot was lower than the pre-
announcement level. 
In addition, the preferred shareholder portfolio affected the management 
decision of a stock split, depending on the size and the business nature of the company. 
According to the equity analysts and merchant bankers, equity investors in Hong Kong 
could be broadly classified into two categories: (i) the investment funds and 
institutional investors who made most of their investments in blue chips and the mighty 
red chips for long term or strategic investment purpose; and (ii) the small or individual 
investors who preferred low priced shares for short term speculative purpose. 
Accordingly, managements of small and growing companies would seek individual and 
small investors as their target shareholders and were anxious to split their shares for 
attracting the small investors once the share price was too high. Conversely, some 
successful corporate managements were reluctant to split their shares after they rose in 
price because they preferred institutional investors and investment funds but not to be 
overwhelmed by an enlarged army of shareholders. The Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation (HSBC) provided a vivid example in this issue: in mid 1997， 
when HSBC was traded around HK$280 per share or over HK$100,000 per lot, most 
market practitioners had forecasted that the company would split its shares as the price 
was too high for the small investors. However, the spokesman ofHSBC had explicitly 
announced that shareholder preference was one of the reasons for their reluctance to 
split. Again, one director quoted Warren Buffett, who loathed both cash dividends and 
stock splits, as the best example. Warren BufFett's holding company, Berkshire 
Hathaway，had traded around US$20,000 per share in 1995 and always remained one 
of the highest priced stock on the New York stock Exchange which only institutional 
investors could afford that. The analysts added other examples in the U.S. include 
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Coca-Cola, a consumer-goods company which tended to be particularly sensitive to 
individual investors, had previously splitted its shares in 1992 two for one. 
Nevertheless，international oil companies such as Exxon and Taxaco, whose shares 
were owned largely by institutional investors, felt that stock splits add to administrative 
expense and eventually cluttered up the shareholder rolls with more names as 
additional individuals bought into the lower priced shares. So they didn't split. 
Liquidity 
Three of the managements stated improving liquidity as the second most highly 
ranked motive for considering a split. And one director said that enhancing liquidity 
was the principal driving force for a split. Despite the inconsistent definition of 
liquidity in research studies, the managements perceived liquidity as the relative ease 
and promptness with which a security might be traded with a minimum price change 
from the previous transaction. They recognized that stock splits could bring the stock 
price into a better trading range and increase the number of shareholders which served 
as a means of improving market liquidity and the frequency of trading, which, in tum, 
might enhance liquidity. Indeed, most companies stated "enhancing shareholder 
liquidity" as the main reason for splitting in their circulars. 
Signaling effect 
Two out of the four managements listed signaling optimistic managerial 
expectations about the future as the third reason for contemplating a split. They 
thought that a stock split could send a message to shareholders, the investment 
community, all the constituencies, that the management of the company were basically 
confident about restoring the post-split earnings per share to the pre-split level. Thus， 
I 
34 
the post-split price would run-up to the pre-split level, too. The directors pointed out 
that stock splits could serve as a means to create pressure for company managements 
who should endeavor to maintain a constant earnings per share both pre- and post-
split. 
Image proiection 
All the managements aware that most investors inferred, at least in part, the 
company type from the prevailing level of stock price, consequently, they showed 
incentives to keep the share price within a target band and "adjust" the level of share 
price through stock splits. They thought that investors usually inferred a relatively 
high share price as a company with a larger market capitalization and in a mature 
industry. Similarly, a relatively low share price might be associated with a small and 
growing company. Their view was confirmed by the equity analysts, professional and 
small investors in our interviews. Hence a young company with fast growth would like 
to stay in a low share price range whereas a more mature company would like to 
remain in a high share price category. On the other hand, stocks which had declined 
significantly in price might prefer to maintain a higher price to avoid being labeled as a 
"penny stock". 
The split factor 
In Hong Kong，the directors of a company had discretion on the split factor 
and the size per round lot after the split which enabled them to maintain an optimal 
trading range. However, it was difficult for the managments to decide on the split 
factor. The directors and merchant bankers advised that, in general, the company 
would assess the capacity of its shareholder base，and considered the split or target 
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price range, as estimated based on recent price movement, not falls too high nor too 
low relative to the industry group or the historical average share price of the company. 
A price that was too low might erode confidence in the company compared to 
competitors and transferred wrong signals, while a high price range might eliminate the 
expected investor interest and caused a decrease in market liquidity. Therefore, 
managements, with the advice and assistance of the merchant banker, would study the 
share prices of companies comparable to its own company based on market value to 
make sure that the post-split price would not put the company at lower end of the peer 
group. 
Effectiveness 
All the managements in our interview believed that stock splits are useful in 
realigning the share prices to an optimal trading range which increased the 
attractiveness of their shares to more investors, thus, the shareholder base would be 
enlarged. Besides, they indicated that splits were effective in enhancing liquidity. Yet 
they could not find any evidence which supported their signaling intention. From their 
experiences, both the shareholders and other market practitioners had not get any 
message such as optimistic managerial expectations from the splits actions. At last, 
they were unable to comment on the function of fiiture fund raising as they had not 
initiated any fund raising activities after the splits. 
Market Comments 
General comments 
All the merchant bankers, equity analysts and investors in our study shared the 
same view on stock splits: splits in Hong Kong was a strange phenomenon, the post-
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Split share prices always run-up to the pre-split levels. They believed splits as 
managements' providing "support" to the share price and agreed that it enhanced 
liquidity. Yet they, except one small investor, didn't think that splits signified 
favorable prospects of the company. Accordingly, some investors, especially the 
individual ones, were excited to buy split shares for speculative purpose, tipping that 
the market price after split would increase to the pre-split level so that they could eam 
a handsome profit. The decreased dollar value per round lot or the trading range by 
themselves did not induce their incentives to buy that particular share as the dollar 
value per round lot was already small in Hong Kong. Professional investors were not 
as positive about a stock split as individual investors because they bought shares by 
studying the fundamentals of listed companies. However, they welcomed stock splits 
as they would benefit more from price appreciation if they held that shares. Equity 
analysts held the same view as the professional investors and regarded stock splits as 
an "non-event" since it had no economic benefit for the company. It was not 
surprising that they would not recommend a "buy" for the splitting shares. 
Notwithstanding, merchant bankers believed that the post-split price run-up which 
increased the market capitalization of the company could facilitate bank borrowing 
activities and served as a means to broaden the shareholder base for future fund raising 
purpose, which depended on market sentiment and level of trading activity. Two of 
the merchant bankers indicated that splits could strengthen the equity base of the 
company by enhancing the marketability ofi ts shares. 
Image proiection 
If the current share price level of a company was high relative to the industrial 
average, a split would be considered as a rational and positive action by the equity 
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analysts. On the contrary, for those share price which did not deviate from or lower 
than its industrial average, pre-split share price and split factor were the primary 
determinants of the image of a splitting company. Both the merchant bankers and 
analysts regarded splitting ofhigh priced shares with a small split factor as a strategy of 
the company to widen its shareholder base. They had positive comments on those 
companies. Conversely, splitting oflow priced shares (less than HK$3 per share) 
would project a poor image such as a "penny" stock for the market practitioners. 
Some equity analysts showed little respect to those companies as the quality ofits 
shareholders was not guaranteed in that a greater proportion ofits shareholders might 
be small speculators. Investors were indifferent to the splitting and non-splitting 
companies. By contrast, stock-splitting companies in the U.S. were regarded by the 
equity analysts and professional investors as successful, characterized by rising sales, 
earnings, future prospects and share prices. Otherwise, a split would not be relevant. 
A strong signal was sent to market that management continue to be optimistic about 
company's growth and projected strong company image. 
Split factor 
The merchant bankers and analysts noted that the split factors were always 
positively correlated with the pre-split share price but negatively correlated with the 
market capitalization of the splitting company. It confirmed the idea that larger firms 
preferred a higher trading range. The merchant bankers would then advise the 
company on choosing a split factor such that investors' inferences about company 
value and image corresponded to the company's split factor choices. Accordingly, 
companies with high share prices were likely to issue larger splits but also preferred a 
higher trading range because of their higher market capitalization. 
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Benefit to shareholders 
The managements, equity analysts and professional investors realized that most 
shareholders, especially the major ones, like stock splits as the post-split share prices 
always run-up to the pre-split levels, thereby increasing the total market capitalization 
of the company. They thought perhaps psychology was involved, the shareholders 
might, felt richer and enjoyed higher status even though the dollar value of their 
investment, the price earning ratio and their stake in the company were all unchanged. 
Bonus issue versus stock soiit 
A bonus issue, sometimes called a "capitalization" issue, is similar to a stock 
split in that they divide the company pie into smaller slices without affecting the 
fundamental position of the existing shareholders. If the managements of a company 
wanted to reduce the price of its shares, why they chose a stock split but not a bonus 
issue? How about the merchant bankers' advice? They claimed that stock splits were 
generally used after a sharp price run-up, when a large price reduction was sought. 
Bonus issues were occasionally used on a regular annual basis to serve as sweeteners 
for the shareholders' support of the company. Besides, unlike stock splits, bonus 
issues were made to existing shareholders out of the company's share premium 
account or by capitalizing reserves. They were therefore well perceived by the equity 
analysts and investors as the directors' expression of confidence in satisfactory future 





We have conducted a comprehensive study on stock splits in the Hong Kong 
stock market. Our analysis shows that stock splits are associated with a positive and 
statistically significant announcement effects which is consistent with most academic 
researches such as Charest (1978), Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), Lamourex 
and Poon (1987) and Wu and Chan (1996). Yet we do not find any exercise date 
effects nor any significant change in volatility and risk after the split. Given the special 
market perceptions on stock splits in Hong Kong, we think the results may be 
interpreted in the following way: As mentioned in our interview results, market 
practitioners regard splits as a strange phenomenon in which the post-split price always 
run-up to the pre-split level. Thus, the investors are anxious to buy splitting shares 
once the company announces a stock split, expecting to eam a profit derived from 
post-split price run-up. Besides, they don't get any other message from a stock split 
announcement. This market perception may account for the significant and positive 
announcement effect but insignificant exercise date effect. Moreover, the general 
expectation on a post-split price run-up may minimize the volatility and risk occurred 
pre- and post-split. 
The interview results suggest that the primary motive for stock splits is future 
fund raising, followed by enhancing liquidity and signaling optimistic managerial 
expectations about the fiiture. Future fund raising can be facilitated by broadening the 
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shareholder base, which in tum can be achieved by restating the share price to an 
optimal trading range so as to attract more investors. Comparing these results to prior 
survey research suggests that managements' motives for stock splits, especially trading 
range and liquidity, have endured for a long time. The results also show that the 
buying behavior of splitting shares is different between the small and professional 
investors, which is similar to Kryzanowski and Zhang's (1996) conclusion that stock 
splits are associated with significant changes in trading pattems of small traders but 
have little effect on that of the large traders. Although our definition on the two 
categories of investors are somewhat different from that of Kryzanowski and Zhang 
(1996)，it provides some insight on the differences in trading behaviors between 
different types of investors. 
The study on the distribution of pre- and post-split share prices show that the 
largest group of pre-split share price ranges is from HK$3.01 to HK$10 per share. 
After the split, the largest category of price range is HK$1.01 to HK$3 per share. 
These results are consistent with those presented by Wu and Chan (1996). 
Interestingly, the merchant bankers and equity analysts in our interviews indicated that 
splitting oflow priced shares (less than HK$3 per share) would project a poor image 
to the market. The study ofWu and Chan (1996) further revealed that the largest 
group of share price ranges is from HK$1.01 to HK$3 per share after the reverse split. 
Altogether, these evidences provide some support for a preferred trading range in the 
Hong Kong stock market which appears to be around HK$3 per share. However, it is 
immature to draw such a conclusion at this early stage. We think that the subject of 
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MARKET MODEL ADNORMAL RETURNS OF STOCK SPLITS FOR THE 
SELECTED SAMPLES (AROUND ANNOUNCEMENT DATE) 
Event Average Cumidadve Average Cumulative t-value t-value 
Date Return Average Abnormal Average ofAAR ofCAAR 
Return Return Abnormal 
Return 
(AR) (CR) (AAR) (CAAR) 
-15 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0678 -0.0701 
-14 0.0061 -0.0028 -0.0051 -0.0063 -0.0952 -0.0156 
-13 -0.0107 -0.0135 0.0025 -0.0038 0.4455 -0.0012 
-12 -0.0101 -0.0236 -0.0082 -0.0120 -0.2397 -0.0123 
-11 0.0067 -0.0169 0.0023 -0.0097 0.3117 -0.0230 
-10 -0.0130 -0.0299 0.0000 -0.0097 0.5785 -0.0030 
-9 -0.0009 -0.0308 -0.0025 -0.0122 -0.5515 -0.0356 
-8 0.0053 -0.0255 0.0008 -0.0114 0.0553 -0.0036 
-7 0.0039 -0.0216 0.0105 -0.0009 5.5224 **** -0.1236 
-6 0.0226 0.0010 0.0035 0.0026 1.7980 » 0.5696 
-5 0.0002 0.0012 0.0003 0.0029 0.1464 1.8930 » 
-4 0.0020 0.0032 0.0010 0.0039 2.3749 ** 2.3200 *• 
-3 0.0130 0.0162 0.0130 0.0169 7.7715 »»•• 8.3690 *•»» 
-2 0.0300 0.0462 0.0145 0.0314 7.4266 • • • • 8.6900 **** 
-1 0.0523 0.0985 0.0123 0.0437 4.2340 »•»» 9.3660 »»*» 
0 0.0296 0.1281 0.0844 0.1281 3.6704 • • • 8.3690 • • • • 
1 -0.0012 0.1269 -0.0008 0.1273 -0.6230 7.9830 »»*• 
2 -0.0030 0.1239 -0.0014 0.1260 -1.7100 • 4.3695 **** 
3 0.0002 0.1241 0.0020 0.1280 -1.9685 * 3.5689 •*» 
4 0.0046 0.1287 0.0027 0.1307 -2.0958 » 5.3145 **** 
5 -0.0089 0.1198 -0.0010 0.1296 -1.9853 » 7.2893 *••• 
6 -0.0061 0.1136 -0.0006 0.1291 -3.5690 *»» 2.5690 • • 
7 -0.0107 0.1029 -0.0078 0.1213 -1.9870 • 1.5980 * 
8 -0.0101 0.0929 -0.0145 0.1068 -0.9988 4.5600 »•»» 
9 0.0067 0.0995 0.0007 0.1075 0.0534 3.2690 »•• 
10 -0.0130 0.0865 -0.0016 0.1058 -1.8965 » 3.5690 »*» 
11 0.0061 0.0926 0.0079 0.1137 -1.9685 •* 4.3680 »»•• 
12 -0.0011 0.0916 -0.0007 0.1130 -1.6800 2.3470 •* 
13 -0.0066 0.0850 -0.0053 0.1077 -0.3548 1.6950 • 
14 -0.0064 0.0786 0.0101 0.1178 2.1236 »» 4.5000 •»»» 
15 -0.0002 0.0784 0.0059 0.1237 0.4358 2.3690 »» 
* Denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 
** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
*** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 




MARKET MODEL ADNORMAL RETURNS OF STOCK SPLITS FOR THE 
SELECTED SAMPLES (AROUND EX- DATE) 
Event Average Cumulative Average Cumulative t-vahK t-vahK 
Date Retum Average Abnormal Average ofAAR ofCAAR 
Return Return Abnormal 
Return 
(AR) (CR) (AAR) (CAAR) 
-15 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0254 -0.9862 
-14 -0.0021 -0.0066 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0357 -0.3654 
-13 0.0009 -0.0056 0.0045 0.0018 0.1671 0.2360 
-12 -0.0073 -0.0130 -0.0047 -0.0029 -0.0899 -0.2360 
-11 0.0030 -0.0100 0.0032 0.0002 0.1169 0.0021 
-10 -0.0073 -0.0173 -0.0074 -0.0072 -0.2169 -0.2030 
-9 -0.0009 -0.0182 -0.0057 -0.0128 -0.2068 -0.1593 
-8 0.0053 -0.0129 0.0050 -0.0078 0.1298 -0.0020 
-7 0.0039 -0.0089 -0.0025 -0.0103 -0.0623 -0.1458 
-6 0.0126 0.0036 0.0141 0.0038 0.2825 0.0036 
-5 0.0002 0.0038 0.0008 0.0046 0.0173 0.9530 
-4 0.0003 0.0041 -0.0004 0.0042 -0.0122 0.0025 
-3 0.0072 0.0113 0.0069 0.0111 0.1939 0.1236 
-2 -0.0039 0.0074 -0.0037 0.0074 -0.0890 1.2360 
-1 -0.0030 0.0044 -0.0023 0.0051 -0.1248 1.8560 • 
0 0.0132 0.0176 0.0083 0.0134 0.2425 1.2360 
1 -0.0004 0.0173 -0.0080 0.0054 -0.1379 1.0230 
2 -0.0102 0.0070 -0.0136 -0.0081 -0.3815 -0.9860 
3 0.0002 0.0072 0.0040 -0.0041 0.0690 -0.8630 
4 0.0046 0.0119 0.0047 0.0006 0.1159 0.0020 
5 -0.0089 0.0029 -0.0103 -0.0097 -0.3773 -1.0200 
6 -0.0061 -0.0032 -0.0056 -0.0153 -0.1754 -0.9520 
7 -0.0107 -0.0140 -0.0078 -0.0231 -0.3219 -0.2360 
8 -0.0101 -0.0240 -0.0145 -0.0376 -0.3745 -0.0369 
9 0.0067 -0.0173 -0.0007 -0.0383 -0.0200 -0.0326 
10 -0.0130 -0.0303 -0.0163 -0.0546 -0.3841 -0.5236 
11 0.0061 -0.0243 0.0079 -0.0467 0.1464 -0.0024 
12 -0.0011 -0.0253 -0.0007 -0.0474 -0.0326 -0.1559 
13 -0.0066 -0.0319 -0.0053 -0.0527 -0.1330 -0.8630 
14 0.0064 -0.0256 0.0101 -0.0426 0.2018 -1.0213 
15 0.0056 -0.0200 0.0059 -0.0368 0.1634 -1.2690 
* Denotes significanceatthe 10 percent level. 
** Denotes significance at the 5 pa-oent level. 
*** Denotes significance at the 1 pa-oent level. 
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STOCK SPLIT SAMPLES FROM 1990 TO 1996 
Year Stock Particulars Effective Date 
1990 The Sincere Co Ltd 1 into 20 20/4/90 
The HK and China Gas Co 1 into 2 27/4/90 
Magaway Investments Holdings Ltd 1 into 2 4-Jun-90 
Tem Properties Co Ltd 1 into 2 22-Jun-90 
Pacific Concord Holding Ltd 2 into 5 2-Jul-90 
Emperor hivestment Ltd 1 into 5 2-Aug-90 
Uniword Holdings Ltd 1 into 2 14-Aug-90 
Kam Shing Memational 1 into 5 24-Aug-90 
Golden HiU Land Development Co Ltd 1 into 5 6-Sep-90 
First South China Corporation Ltd 1 into 10 10-Sep-90 
Essential Enterprises Co Ltd 1 into 2 25-Sep-90 
Shun Ho Property Development Ltd 1 into 2 12-Nov-90 
Ong Holdings _ Ltd 1 into 2 lO-Dec-90 
1991 ChungWahShipbuMng&Engineering(Holdings)CoLtd l into2 4-Jan-91 
Cheung Wah Development Co Ltd 1 into 2 30-Sep-91 
Tem Fat Hing Fung(Holdings) Ltd 1 into 4 1 O^ t -91 
1992 South Sea Development Co Ltd 1 into 2 12-May-92 
Wai Yick Ltd 1 into 4 7-Sep-92 
Effi Development (bitemational) Ltd 1 into 2 30"Oct-92 
1993 Mandarin Dragon Holdings Ltd 1 into 5 20-Jul-93 
Silver Grant Meraational bidustries Ltd 1 into 5 29-Sep-93 
Continental Mariner Investment Co Ltd 1 into 2 4*Oct-93 
Cable & Wirdess plc 1 into 2 29-Oct-93 
1994 First Asia Mernational Holdings Ltd 1 into 5 27-Sep-94 
1996 Dah Hwa International (Holdings) Ltd 1 into 2 18-Jan-% 
Hong Kong BuUding and Loan Agency Ltd/The USI Holdings Ltd 1 into 5 26-Jun-96 
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